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The European dilemma: Evaluating the implications of UEFA 
Europa League participation on English Premier League clubs. 
Abstract 
For clubs qualifying for the UEFA Europa League, participation generates a series of 
tensions. Football’s European governing body, UEFA, has provided generous 
financial rewards for those clubs, but with qualification comes additional pressures on 
playing squads which are often less able to deal with the performative demands of an 
extra competition, as they generally possess fewer financial resources compared with 
teams that regularly gain UEFA Champions League qualification. This paper 
evaluates these conflicting tensions. 
The study takes a detailed quantitative analysis of the associated costs and benefits for 
four Premier League clubs that have repeatedly participated in the Europa League 
over an eight seasons. The analysis demonstrates a positive financial benefit of 
participation, but this is only significant if the club progresses to the later stages of the 
competition and has a robust playing squad. Participation may also have further less 
tangible benefits.   
This research fills a gap in a lack of analysis based on reliable empirical data as to the 
impact of participation in this competition on clubs.  
 
Keywords: Europa League, Finance, UEFA, Europeanisation, Management Decision  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3  
Introduction 
There is general consensus that the landscape of European football has undergone 
profound change since the early 1990s, especially for those clubs operating at the elite 
levels of the sport at club level.1 Those promoting such arguments generally point to 
the growth of club turnover in major Western European football leagues, the 
increasing importance of the UEFA Champions League to various ‘phases’ of 
‘Europeanisation,’ as well as the formation and influence of elite clubs’ organisations, 
such as the G.14. The significance of Europe, and specifically the Champions League, 
to the changing financial landscape of European football can be seen in yearly 
commentaries made by commentators on the sport, such as the accountancy firm, 
Deloitte. Whilst the Deloitte review2 of the Premier League and the European ‘rich 
list’ accounts for fluctuations in club revenues and financial performance over a 
yearly period, the discourses concerning the important economic value of the 
Champions League to those participating in it have remained a consistent feature of 
these documents over time. 
Set against the dominance of the Champions League concerning accounts of 
the changing face of European football, this paper argues for the inclusion of the 
Europa league (formerly known as the UEFA Cup until its rebranding in 2009) within 
such analyses. In particular, we argue that the clubs who qualify for this particular 
competition are faced with a different set of challenges to those clubs that qualify, and 
qualify regularly, for the Champions League. These are difficult for clubs to resolve, 
but are nevertheless consequential for them because they place additional 
performance and resourcing pressures onto organisations that are variably equipped to 
meet them. Qualification arguably involves successful clubs re-orienting their teams’ 
priorities given that they will be faced with the task of playing in an additional 
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competition whilst also continuing to compete within the Premier League, the two 
English cup competitions, and ensuring that they are compliant with the UEFA 
Financial Fair Play regulations.  This paper seeks to map out these tensions in more 
detail and to position them in general terms against discussions concerning the 
‘Europeanisation’ of football, especially in relation to football finances within Europe 
and those of the Premier League. To assess the impact of Europa League qualification 
on our sample of Premier League clubs, we deploy quantitative analysis, weighing up 
the costs and benefits using financial data. Findings show that there are financial 
benefits for those playing in the Europa League, although when compared with the 
overall wealth generated by the moneys at stake in the UEFA Champions League and 
English Premier League, these would not be considered highly lucrative. 
 
The Europa League and the Europeanisation of football 
Although there is no one accepted definition of the term, ‘Europeanisation’ refers here 
to the increasingly powerful role played by European-level policy-making on 
domestic policies and practices as well as the complex interplay between entities 
representing national interests when arguing for their preferences via processes of 
negotiation. In this way, the Europeanisation of football can be viewed as a complex 
relationship between UEFA as the sport’s European governing body, acts of 
‘eventisation’ such as the European Championship, Champions League and the UEFA 
Cup/Europa League, and the media. The interplay of these forces has acted to 
institutionalise and sediment the legitimacy of UEFA due to the decisive role played 
by the media in supporting its competitions, whilst simultaneously generating the 
income and audiences for them. As argued by Martin,3 football’s ‘mediascapes’ and 
‘financescapes’ have become intertwined with the televisual mediascape of football 
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now being experienced as a process of Europeanisation with the coverage given to 
football broadening from an exclusively domestic focus to an increasingly European 
one. It could be argued that the Europa League has the potential to play a heightened 
role in the assertion of European football, but as yet its influence here is weak due to 
the lack of status and rewards associated with the competition, especially when 
compared to those associated with the Champions League. 
Despite an economic downturn and continuing fiscal uncertainty experienced 
by several EU members, the position of European football is argued by some 
commentators to be robust, in good health and impervious to a European financial 
crisis. According to findings by Deloitte,4 the top 20 European clubs generated 
€4.84bn in revenue during the 2011/12 season, representing an increase of 10% on the 
previous years. This figure is estimated to account for more than a quarter of the 
European football industry and is expected to grow in the foreseeable future.5 One of 
the main factors behind such statements is the ability of the top four clubs to sustain 
their competitive presence within the UEFA Champions League, with commentators 
arguing that the importance of finishing within the top four positions in the English 
Premier League in order to qualify for this competition cannot be underestimated. As 
noted by Kennedy and Kennedy,6 the Champions League is now confirmed as the 
ultimate global club competition attracting a worldwide audience of more than four 
billion viewers per season, with viewing figures for the final surpassing those of the 
NFL’s Superbowl, boosting the status of UEFA and the Europeanisation process. This 
status is further enhanced through the moneys it generates for the Champions League 
as UEFA receives over €500 million in broadcasting and sponsorship income. These 
sums have been increased by the recent contract with new entrants to the UK 
broadcasting market, BT Sport, which paid £897 million for a three year deal to 
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broadcast live Champions League and Europa Cup matches.7 Participating Premier 
League clubs did less well in the 2012/2013 CL competition, earning between €28-35 
million each from TV and bonus income,8 although, the moneys attained by the 
Champions League finalists dwarfed these figures. Tournament winners, Bayern 
Munich, and runners up Borussia Dortmund earned €55 million and €54 million 
respectively. At this juncture it is pertinent to note that this kind of lavish 
remuneration and attendant media focus has rarely, if ever, been associated with the 
UEFA Cup or the Europa League and whilst the additional moneys accruing from the 
2013 BT Sport deal might enrich the Europa League, there is currently no sign that 
this will follow. The 2012/2013 Europa League finalists, SL Benfica and Chelsea FC, 
won €5.7 and €10.7 million respectively during the same season.9 
Set against this picture, other analyses of the financial health of the European 
football and the Premier League offer a less certain account.10 The widening 
participation of clubs in Europe has resulted in some clubs spending increasing 
amounts of money on transfer fees and wages. This has led to a sense of clubs 
‘spiralling out of control’ as new owners seek to outbid other high spending clubs11 
and the threat of bankruptcy hangs over a number of clubs. Several studies highlight 
the size of the financial instability currently characterising clubs and leagues12 and 
Cuttler succinctly describes the strains experienced by clubs faced with contemporary 
performance challenges thus: 
‘…the face of European football is contorted by the strain experienced by 
clubs attempting to remain on a financial tightrope which is constantly being 
yanked by their competitors. It’s as simple as this. Clubs need to be successful 
if they are to prosper. But to be competitive they have to invest in player 
transfers and wages which, all too often, they are unable to afford. For all but 
the biggest clubs, every season represents a gamble. For those whose gambles 
do not pay off the result is relegation, reduced income and the prospect of 
severe financial difficulty. It’s a kind of financial Russian roulette’.13 
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Currently, the Premier League generates the highest levels of income but also the 
highest levels of debt, standing at £2.6 billion in 2011/12. Whilst a new TV deal could 
assist clubs in eradicating their debts, doing this would require any rise in player 
salaries to be kept to a respectable level14 and given the tensions depicted by Cuttler, 
and historical responses of clubs to increases in income originating from enhanced 
TV moneys, it is questionable as to whether such fiscal prudence would be 
forthcoming.  
 According to the UEFA Executive Committee,15 the issue of financial 
instability has created difficult market conditions for clubs in Europe and can 
negatively impact their revenue generating ability and viability as a going concern. 
This urged UEFA to introduce the ‘Financial Fair Play Rules’ (FFPR),16 the scope of 
which was to introduce more discipline and rationality of clubs’ finances to rebalance 
competition by enhancing long-term financial stability in European club football17 
and with a view that in the longer term, clubs carrying a large debt loading will reach 
a breakeven position. It is against this picture of local fiscal instability and 
supranational attempts to instigate better systems of financial governance that these 
tensions concerning the Europa League are played out. 
 
The Europa League: tensions and dilemmas 
For many clubs that qualify for the Europa League, attaining this status is a cause for 
celebration because it can often mark the highest achievement for the organisation in 
its history. Participation in the competition is often perceived and promoted as a mark 
of success for the club’s fans, Board members, employees, and investors. For 
managers, players and backroom staff, competing in the Europa League is a 
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significant career achievement and as such it can mark the pinnacle of many 
professional careers. For some supporters it is an opportunity for a ‘European Tour’: 
following the team overseas to play in new locations and providing new opponents to 
observe at home.  However, the competition raises a number of tensions and 
challenges for participating clubs, many of which have their origins in the 
increasingly precarious nature of football club finances. 
 In 2009 the UEFA Cup was re-branded, as witnessed in the change in title. 
The group stage of the competition was expanded from 8 to 12 groups of four teams. 
The top two teams from each group joined in the Round of 32 by the eight clubs 
finishing third in their UEFA Champions League group. This expansion of the League 
offered European football to a wider group of clubs and nations. To this end, the 
group stage of the 2011/12 Europa League contained clubs from 24 different nations. 
In 2010/11 the Europa League distributed €150m between the 56 clubs reaching at 
least the group stage of the competition.  According to Deloitte,18 the rebranding of 
the League, including the collective selling of repackaged broadcast rights to cover 
more of the competition and the introduction of a new presenting sponsor, has seen 
the 2010/11 Europa League distributions increase almost fourfold from the €39m 
distributed in the last season of the UEFA Cup, 2008/09. For individual clubs, the 
increased distributions meant that reaching the group stage of the Europa League in 
2010/11 was worth at least €1.1m, compared with €0.2m two years earlier in the 
UEFA Cup. For those countries with high value broadcast rights, the market pool 
distribution of earnings can be significant, as witnessed by losing semi-finalist, 
Villarreal, who managed to earn €9 million in distributions which in the 2010/11 
season was the highest of any Europa League club, including the winners FC Porto.19 
In May 2013, UEFA announced that the winners of the 2015 Europa League would 
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qualify for the Champions League for the following season.20 No further changes 
were made with regards to domestic qualification rules. 
 The implications of Europa League participation for Premier League clubs 
need to be set within the context of English football’s financial present and near 
future; clubs have been struggling (and have often failed) to avoid financial crises for 
a number of years.21  Participating in the EL could potentially offer the possibility of 
generating additional revenues. For example, in the 2009/10 Europa League Fulham 
FC generated €10.6 million.22 Although the team lost in the final to Atletico Madrid, 
the sums generated constituted 16% of the club’s revenue for that season.23 
Participation in European competitions should take place whilst following stringent 
set of rules regarding the control of relevant costs as part of a breakeven requirement 
set by UEFA. It is therefore important for clubs to ensure that they do not breach 
Financial Fair Play regulations and it could be envisaged that clubs may not want to 
stretch themselves excessively, even if that means a failure to meet the qualification 
standard needed to enter the Europa League. 
 Other benefits for participating in the EL lie in the experience it gives of 
playing European competition. For clubs, managers and teams with aspirations to 
playing in the CL, this is highly valuable. This was seen in the case of Zenit St 
Petersburg whose participation in the UEFA Cup and EL gave them valuable 
experience of competing in European competitions. This helped them progress 
through the 2011/12 Champions League group stage into the knockout rounds. 
Similarly, Shakhtar Donetsk’s experiences in this competition assisted them in 
qualifying for the quarter-finals of the 2010/11 Champions League before losing to 
the eventual winners, FC Barcelona.24 Successful managers competing in the Europa 
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League have been vocal in their support for the competition within the Premier 
League, as witnessed in comments made by managers such as Rafa Benitez and 
Andres Villas Boas, who were both winners. This does not always find a receptive 
audience with players who seek ‘Tuesday/Wednesday night football’ of the 
Champions League and perceive the Europa League as being a second-best 
competition. 
 Several UK broadsheet commentators concur with their view and make 
additional points as to the benefits of playing European football, for example, 
Taylor25 and Turner.26  There are long-standing problems and tensions caused by the 
Europa League persist. Strains on playing squads that have limited strength in depth, 
compared to some of their Premier and Europa League competitors, make them more 
vulnerable to potential player injuries.27 Additionally, the balancing of Premier 
League and Europa League commitments can be challenging as managers are 
frequently tasked with maintaining, if not exceeding, Premier League performance. 
This results in generating tensions concerning the priority of club objectives and can 
be particularly acute if the distributions of revenue from domestic leagues are 
substantial. In the case of the Premier League, finishing one place higher at the end of 
the season was worth approximately £0.8 million in the 2012/13 season.28 Clubs 
seeking to enter the Champions League via a top four finish, or to avoid relegation 
from the Premier League, have to assess the value of achieving such aims alongside 
the value of progressing in the Europa League. These kinds of tensions exert a 
significant performance pressure for those clubs competing in the Europa League all 
season as they usually have less strength in their playing squads as well as generally 
having reduced fiscal resources in comparison to the clubs competing in the 
Champions League.  
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 A concern frequently voiced in English football is a perceived lack of 
competition within all but the largest clubs.  Gratton referred to the situation created 
by a lack of ‘competitive balance’ whereupon fans lose interest in matches when they 
believe that the outcome of a match is shifted too far away from one team.29 This state 
of affairs, if it is indeed prevalent, could have a positive effect on Europa League as it 
may mean that the competition is seen as more open and less likely to be dominated 
by a few of the largest and richest clubs, which would tend to be participating in the 
more lucrative Champions League competition. Finally, whilst managers and players 
might find the benefits of strong performances in the Europa League to be highly 
rewarding, their (possible) departure to other teams could be detrimental to team 
performance in the following season.   
 Given these multiple benefits and problems with regards to Europa League 
qualification and prioritising it (or not), it is timely to assess its value. The following 
sections contain quantitative analyses of some of the key tensions previously outlined. 
It will conclude with an analysis of the measurable quantifiable benefits and costs 
arising from participation in a representative sample of English clubs. 
Method 
 
This paper seeks to measure the impact of participation within this competition on a 
number of English Premier League clubs using available, reliable data.  This involves 
a quantitative methodology, weighing up the costs and benefits, using financial 
information and other ‘soft’ information that can be reconciled as a potential financial 
value. The analysis compares the benefit (cost) of participation in the Europa League 
with the cost (benefit) of not participating. The authors note that the relationships 
between participation and a financial cost or benefit must therefore be by correlation 
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rather than measuring causality. As such, provides an important insight not yet 
provided in an academic setting, to our knowledge.  
 A detailed analysis is carried out on a small number of Premier League clubs 
that have entered the Europa League competition over eight seasons, from 2005/06, 
and measures the key costs and benefits associated with participation in it. To achieve 
this, the focus is on the following four English Premier League Clubs: Aston Villa 
FC, Everton FC, Fulham FC and Newcastle United FC. The criteria used to select 
clubs were that: 
 - Each had appeared in the Europa League competition more than once in the prior 
seven seasons. Observing information in the state of participation compared to non- 
participation requires a number of observations in each state. Aston Villa appeared in 
three seasons, 2008/9 to 2010/11 inclusive. Everton appeared in three seasons, 2007/8 
to 2009/10 inclusive. Fulham appeared twice, in 2009/10 and 2011/12. Newcastle 
United appeared twice, in 2006/7 and 2012/13.  
-  For each club, qualification for the Europa League was considered to be a realistic 
goal, rather than a ‘consolation prize’ for failure to achieve qualification for the more 
lucrative Champions League. Therefore, clubs that had taken part in the Europa 
League in recent seasons, but with a greater success in terms of Premier League 
position, such as Chelsea, Tottenham Hotspur and Liverpool, were excluded from the 
sample, as the authors judged that these clubs would have more likely targeted 
Champions League qualification as their aim, rather than Europa League 
participation.  
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 In order to provide a quantitative measure of the implications of Europa 
League, various cost/ benefit metrics are produced which cover relevant indicators. 
The indicators and their data sources are as follows: 
-  Prize moneys are awarded for participation in the Europa League competition. This 
includes share of broadcasting moneys taken from the UEFA Financial Report.30  
Prize moneys are awarded for league position in the PL.31 
- Match day revenues are measured by stadium attendance figures from home games 
in the Europa competition taken from UEFA match reports. Domestic league 
attendance figures are taken from respective editions of the Sky Sport Football 
Yearbook (Rollin, 2005 - 2012) released annually.32  
- Annual disaggregated revenue information, including commercial revenue, is taken 
from respective club annual reports provided by Companies House.33  
- Club wage expenditures and player transfer fees are both measured annually by 
Deloitte (Various years).34  
Additionally, due consideration is made of the non-quantifiable costs and benefits, 
such as the possible effects on the existing playing squad, the attraction of player and 
managerial talent and perceptions of the status achieved by participation in a 
European competition. These all form part of the ‘tensions’ outlined previously.  
 The research approach also addresses the issue of whether the clubs concerned 
are able to leverage the potential commercial spin-offs associated with increased 
global exposure to their benefit. 
 
14  
Results and analysis 
In the following analysis, a number of measures have been used to assess the 
‘success’, or otherwise, of Europa League qualification. 
Prize money and UEFA distributions 
Table 1 lists prize money obtained in respect of Europa League competitions (UEFA, 
2013).35 It shows that Fulham have been successful in achieving moneys in excess of 
£11m, which was largely the result of reaching the final of the competition in the 
2009/10 season. In comparison, Aston Villa has gained relatively small amounts, 
losing in the preliminary play-off stages in two of the three seasons in which they 
qualified. 
 
Place Table 1 here. 
 
Premier League position distribution money 
 
It has often been suggested, albeit anecdotally, that the extra demands imposed by 
clubs’ participation in the Europa League, such as the increased risk of injuries to 
already stretched playing squads, has an adverse effect on their Premier League 
performance in the seasons of Europa League competition. Table 2 shows the change 
in league position, by comparing the average league position in the seasons of Europa 
League participation with those of the seasons immediately prior to qualification for it 
(allowing also for the number of years of participation).    
 
Place Table 2 here. 
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The evidence suggests that league performance suffers when a club plays in the 
Europa League, with the notable exception of Everton. These effects were particularly 
marked in the case of Newcastle United, where the club’s league position worsened 
by 11 places in the 2012/13 season and 6 places in the 2006/07 season. This supports 
the findings of Verheijen,36 showing that Europa League games played on a Thursday 
followed by a league game on Sunday costs clubs an average of 0.41 league points 
per game. The points are lost as a result of the detrimental impact player fatigue has 
on clubs’ performances.  
 
 A further analysis of the effects of Europa League participation on league 
performance is achieved by considering the total number of Europa League matches 
played by each of our sample clubs during the league season and calculating the total 
points deficit (using Verheijen’s above figure of 0.41 points per game). At the end of 
the season concerned, the effect on the clubs’ final league positions, had they not 
suffered this points deficit, can be calculated and a monetary prize amount lost is 
reached from the data, shown in the Table 3. The results identify a detrimental change 
in financial reward for all clubs. 
 
Place Table 3 here. 
 
Match day revenues 
Attendance figures for Europa League matches, including qualifying matches, are 
used to calculate gross match day income figures. Season ticket holders generally do 
not get a free entry to cup competition matches, so this would be marginal income 
above that obtained from season ticket sales, shown in Table 4.  An average 
admission ticket price of £22 has been assumed,37 which is approximately 20% lower 
16  
than the average ticket price charged for Premier League matches, as clubs often use a 
pricing strategy which targets these matches to try to maximise attendances.  This 
admission price is therefore a conservative estimate. It should be mentioned here that 
although much of a football club’s costs are fixed in nature, for example, overheads 
such rent, depreciation, utilities, basic wages and salaries etc., there are also marginal 
costs involved in the staging of a match. These would include the costs of policing 
and stewarding, for instance, as well as any player bonuses contingent upon the result. 
These are multi-varied and thus difficult to measure, so attendance revenue is used as 
an approximate value. 
Place Table 4 here. 
The table shows that the marginal revenue increases from participating in the Europa 
League for the four selected clubs vary from approximately £5million to £10 million, 
which represents a significant increase in revenue, but which is somewhat dwarfed by 
the levels of money, particularly from broadcasting, from participating in the Premier 
League and UEFA Champions League. 
 If a club’s league form suffers, this may have a direct negative effect on 
league attendances. Table 5 compares average Premier League attendances in the 
seasons of Europa League competition with those in the seasons immediately prior to 
qualification.38 A monetary value has been derived, which assumes that the admission 
price is £28.30 based upon a Premier League minimum adult price,39 then multiplied 
over the 19 home games of the Premier League season. This does not take into 
account that much of the match day revenue would be in the form of prepaid season 
tickets, so the reported monetary effect is over-estimated. In balance, spectators 
(including those who have prepaid) spend on items such as match day programmes, 
merchandising, food and drink, so there is likely to be a drop in these sources of 
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sundry revenue when attendances fall.  The figures in the table below have therefore 
assumed that the above effects counterbalance each other. 
 
 
Place Table 5 here. 
This table shows that there is an insignificant fall in average Premier League 
attendances of less than 1% for three of the four clubs in the season of participation in 
the Europa League. The largest fall was 3.8% in the case of Aston Villa, but that still 
represents a drop in estimated gate money of less than £1m. 
 
Player expenditure 
 
The number of players used in a season is expected to be linked to the number of 
games played. The more matches played, the greater the risk of injuries, putting 
playing squads under additional pressure. In a study of European leagues, Verheijen40 
found that shorter recovery times between games resulted in a decrease in a club’s 
performance and an increase in injury rates. In recent seasons, there has been a 
growing trend for Premier League clubs to use cup matches as a means of blooding 
new talent and resting key players for the potentially more lucrative Premier League 
matches. Therefore, in order to measure the possible effect that Europa League 
participation has had on a squad, the number of players used in Premier League 
games in a season of Europa League participation has been compared with that when 
there were no such extra European demands, shown in Table 6.  
 
Place Table 6 here. 
This shows that, with the exception of Fulham, participation in the Europa League has 
resulted in more players being used for the Premier League. In the case of Newcastle 
18  
United in 2012/13, six more players were used compared with the following season, 
as injuries took their toll on the squad.   
 An analysis of transfer activity at the four clubs during Europa League 
participation shows that in each case annual net transfer spending (the cost of buying 
players less sale proceeds from player sold) was greater than in seasons of non-
Europa League participation, shown in Table 7. In the cases of Aston Villa and 
Newcastle the difference between net transfer spending on players was particularly 
marked in the seasons of EL participation compared with non-EL participation with 
annualised differences of £18.1m and £17.3m for the two clubs respectively. 
Place Table 7 here 
This supports the argument that Europa League participation puts significant strains 
on the playing squad and that one of way addressing this is to bolster the pool of 
available players. It could also be argued that clubs view Europa League participation 
as an attractive ‘pull’ to entice new talent to join the club. Similarly, the players 
themselves may see it as a sign that a club is ambitious and progressive and therefore 
are attracted to it.  
Wage Costs 
The total annual wage costs for each club along with the percentage of turnover are 
shown in Table 8.41 On average, club revenue is higher for all clubs during years of 
participation in the Europa League. With the exception of Newcastle, all clubs 
increased their wage costs during the same seasons, without compensating for 
inflation. 
Place Table 8 here 
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The increase in wage costs, with the exception of Aston Villa, is a smaller 
proportional increase than the rise in revenue. This shows a correlation between 
Europa League participation and spending a smaller proportion of revenue on wages, 
from 72% to 63% in the case of Everton. Aston Villa, however, increased the average 
annual proportion of revenue spent on wages during the seasons participating in the 
Europa League from 81% to 92%. Aston Villa’s wage costs increased to 103% of 
revenue during the 2010/11 season showing a high level of spending during Europa 
League participation.   
Commercial activities 
Commercial revenues may well be enhanced by appearance on an international stage. 
The evidence from the four English clubs considered appears that this is not the case, 
as shown in Table 9 (compiled using annual financial statements, retrieved from 
Companies House),42 where for three of the four clubs commercial revenues as a 
proportion of total revenues fell in the years of EL participation. It should be noted, 
however, that commercial revenues can be measured and presented by clubs in 
different ways so direct comparisons between clubs do not necessarily give a clear 
picture. The description of commercial revenue differs for each club and is shown in 
Table 9. 
Place Table 9 here. 
 
The data show that the clubs’ average commercial revenues in the seasons of Europa 
League participation were lower as a percentage of total revenue than in seasons of 
non-participation, with the exception of Newcastle, for which only one year of 
accounts was obtainable. This suggests that clubs are not making the most of the 
opportunity provided from showcasing their talent in Europe in order to leverage 
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more income for future investment in better players and facilities.  Any such initiative 
would need to consider the effect on the clubs’ supporter base, as recent research by 
Kennedy and Kennedy suggests that commercialisation can both increase supporters’ 
interest with their club, as well as equally create a sense of disillusionment in others.43 
It is noted by way of comparison that the equivalent percentages of commercial 
revenue for the consistent Champions League participants and recent winners, such as 
Manchester United and Chelsea, is typically higher at about 30%. 
 
Overall quantifiable cost/benefits 
Summarising the presented quantitative data gives the following positions for each 
club, shown in Table 10. It should be noted that net transfer spending is excluded 
from this table, as transfer spending is a cost which is capitalised by clubs in their 
balance sheet and then amortised through the income statement, rather than written 
off immediately against income. Also, given the lack of a clear relationship between 
wage costs and Europa League participation (from Table 8), these costs are also 
excluded from the table. There is no evidence to suggest that wages costs were a 
result of, or a determinant of, Europa League participation. Finally, given the wide 
scope that clubs have in deciding how much of their revenues should be designated as 
originating from commercial sources (Table 9) and therefore the lack of consistency 
in comparing it between clubs, these amounts have also been excluded from the 
overall quantitative position in Table 10.  
Place Table 10 here 
This shows that there is a net benefit in category one for all clubs which ranges from 
over £2 million in the case of Aston Villa, to almost £15 million for Fulham. The 
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benefits are particularly marked for clubs that progress to the latter stages of the 
Europa League competition, hence the large prize money received by Fulham after 
reaching the final in 2009/10. Despite a fall in domestic league form during the 
2012/13 season, Newcastle has an £8 million positive impact during seasons of 
participation in the Europa League.  
 The evidence presented here suggests that participation in the Europa League 
can have a positive but small financial impact on a club if the expenditure on players 
is closely constrained. Further, the cost needed to build a competitive squad for the 
Europa League may increase for clubs that are positioned further down the Premier 
League table.  
 
Considerations for further research 
There are the other possible spin-offs that are not captured in the analysis. These may 
include an increased ability to attract and retain top talent or brand awareness. 
Further, there are effects that may have a knock on impact over a period of time not 
accounted for here. Also transfer spending on players is not usually treated as a one-
off overhead or revenue cost, but new player registrations are instead capitalised in 
the balance sheet as intangible assets and amortised through the income statement 
over the duration of the contract. Hence the cost is typically spread over several years 
and so is not included in the overall cost/benefit summary.  
 Additional marginal costs borne by clubs would include, for example, medical 
costs, win/loyalty bonuses payable to players, policing costs, insurance, travel etc. 
Sundry income items, such as sales from merchandising, refreshments etc. directly 
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related to Europa League matches have been assumed to match marginal costs 
associated with matches and have therefore also been ignored for the purposes of this 
analysis.  
 
Conclusions and further research 
This paper uses financial information to address some of the key tensions faced by 
Premier League clubs who play in the Europa League. The relationship of the 
measurements analysed between Europa League participation and non- participation 
reflects a correlation, not causality. This paper shows evidence that on average there 
is some change in the observed variables between two states. Evidence that 
participation in the Europa League has caused these observed changes requires further 
investigation. Results show that participation in the Europa League can return a small 
positive financial benefit. However, the benefit is highly sensitive to the cost of 
playing talent, in transfer fees and wages. Whilst this contributes to the debate 
concerning the problems and benefits accruing to clubs which participate in the 
Europa League, there are a number of areas where further research is needed. Finally, 
whilst the Europa League makes a contribution towards processes of Europeanisation 
of football, that contribution is currently modest and will be likely to remain such 
given the generally slight benefits that accrue to those clubs that participate in it.  
Given these findings, and the caveats made for further research, there is arguably a 
case to be made for UEFA reviewing the moneys it provides for Europa League 
participants both in terms of assisting in the resolution of some of the tensions 
outlined here and as a means of further establishing their presence within the domestic 
competitions of its member countries. 
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Tables 
Table 1. Europa League prize money from 2006/07. 
Club Prize money £’000 -
translated at Euro/£ rate 
28/11/13,44  
Aston Villa      322 
Everton   4,339 
Fulham 11,240 
Newcastle   4,823 
 
Table 2. Premier League positions before and during Europa League participation 
Club League position 
pre-qualification 
to EL 
League position 
during EL comp. 
Total change in 
league position  
Aston Villa 6 7 (average of 3 
seasons) 
     -3 (3 seasons) 
Everton 6 6 (average of 3 
seasons) 
      0 (3 seasons) 
Fulham 7,8 12,9      -6 (2 seasons) 
Newcastle 7,5 13,16    -17 
 
Table 3. Effects on Premier League position by applying average points per game 
deficit figure. 
Club/Season Number of 
matches 
Points deficit 
(@0.41 
points/game) 
Effect on final 
PL place 
Change in league position 
money, £’000 (assumes 
each place is worth £750K) 
Aston Villa          
-2008/09 8 3.28 1 -750 
-2009/10 2 0.82 0 0 
-2010/11 2 0.82 0 0 
Total    -750 
     
Everton                   
-2007/08 10 4.1 0 0 
-2008/09 2 0.82 0 0 
-2009/10 10 4.1 2 -1,500 
Total    -1,500 
     
Fulham        
-2009/10 16 6.56 3 -2,250 
-2011/12 8 3.28 1 -750 
Total    -3,000 
     
Newcastle        
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-2006/07 12 4.92 1 -750 
-2012/13 14 5.74 7 -5,250 
Total    -6,000 
 
Table 4. Match day receipts from Europa League matches. 
Club Average EL 
attendance 
Number of 
matches 
Aggregate 
attendance 
Monetary 
effect (£K) 
Aston Villa 30,400 8 243,200 5,300 
Everton 30,800 11 338,800 7,500 
Fulham 18,600 16 297,600 6,500 
Newcastle 31,800 14 445,200 9,800 
 
Table 5. Premier League average attendances prior and during Europa League 
competition. 
 
Club Average PL 
attendance in 
seasons prior 
to participation 
Average PL 
attendance in 
seasons of 
participation 
Change (%) Monetary 
effect per 
annum (£K) 
Aston Villa 40,029 38,526 -3.8 -808 
Everton 36,736 36,449 -0.8 -155 
Fulham 24,689 24,601 -0.4   -48 
Newcastle 50,984 50,602 -0.7 -205 
 
Table 6. Change in number of players used in Premier League as a result of Europa 
league participation. 
 
Club Number of 
players used in 
PL in most 
recent season of 
EL participation 
Number of 
players used in 
PL after most 
recent season of 
EL participation 
Change  
Aston Villa 32 27 5 
Everton 28 24 4 
Fulham 28 29 -1 
Newcastle 32 26 6 
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 Table 7. N
et transfer spending com
parison in seasons of Europa League and non-Europa League participation, includes player loans. 
 
 
Aston Villa 
Everton 
Fulham
 
N
ew
castle 
 
2008/9 to 2010/11 
inclusive 
2007/8 to 2009/10 
inclusive 
2009/10 and 2011/12 
2006/7 and 2012/13 
 
N
et count 
N
et £ 
N
et 
count 
N
et £ 
N
et 
count 
N
et £ 
N
et 
count 
N
et £ 
2013/14 
3 
9944 
0 
-7480 
-6 
9812 
-5 
1258 
2012/13 
5 
21674 
-4 
2552 
-1 
-18850 
-4 
15545 
2011/12 
-9 
-20601 
2 
-17248 
4 
5658 
0 
8910 
2010/11 
1 
7920 
-1 
-4312 
-3 
-1153 
5 
-25124 
2009/10 
7 
21824 
1 
-4435 
1 
6252 
-3 
-18291 
2008/09 
4 
45874 
6 
10363 
-7 
9394 
11 
-5478 
2007/08 
-6 
2420 
1 
15444 
6 
26250 
2 
5896 
2006/07 
2 
20130 
-5 
17248 
-3 
2891 
-4 
17314 
2005/06 
2 
8923 
6 
22462 
-2 
1694 
1 
26708 
Avg EL 
4 
           25,206  
3 
             7,124  
3 
             5,955  
-4 
           16,430  
Avg non EL 
-1 
             7,082  
0 
             2,204  
-2 
             4,291  
2 
          -  874  
Difference 
5 
           18,124  
3 
             4,920  
5 
             1,664  
-6 
           17,304  
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 Table 8: W
age costs and revenue w
ith and w
ithout participation in the Europa League  
 
Aston Villa 
Everton 
Fulham
 
N
ew
castle 
 
2008/9 to 2010/11 
inclusive 
2007/8 to 2009/10 inclusive 
2009/10 and 2011/12 
2006/7 and 2012/13 
 
Turnover 
(£000) 
W
age costs 
(£000) 
Turnover 
(£000) 
W
age costs 
(£000) 
Turnover 
(£000) 
W
age costs 
(£000) 
Turnover 
(£000) 
W
age costs 
(£000) 
2011/12 
79750 
75109 
94%
 
80531 
63389 
79%
 
78652 
62257 
79%
 
93300 
64097 
69%
 
2010/11 
92028 
94795 
103%
 
82021 
58026 
71%
 
76405 
57672 
75%
 
88464 
53585 
61%
 
2009/10 
90979 
79974 
88%
 
79076 
54311 
69%
 
76398 
49285 
65%
 
52417 
47458 
91%
 
2008/09 
84203 
70577 
84%
 
79669 
49069 
62%
 
63160 
46232 
73%
 
86075 
73312 
85%
 
2007/08 
75537 
50447 
67%
 
75650 
44480 
59%
 
52046 
39344 
76%
 
99358 
79329 
80%
 
2006/07 
52674 
43194 
82%
 
51412 
38427 
75%
 
39244 
35169 
90%
 
87083 
56709 
65%
 
2005/06 
48510 
38255 
79%
 
58123 
36966 
64%
 
37126 
30102 
81%
 
85900 
52183 
61%
 
Avg EL 
89070 
81782 
92%
 
78132 
49287 
63%
 
77525 
55771 
72%
 
87083 
56709 
65%
 
Avg non EL 
64118 
51751 
81%
 
68022 
49202 
72%
 
53596 
41704 
79%
 
84252 
61661 
74%
 
Difference 
24952 
30031 
11%
 
10110 
85 
-9%
 
23929 
14067 
-7%
 
2831 
-4952 
-9%
 
 
27 
 Table 9. C
om
m
ercial revenue as a %
 of total revenue in seasons of Europa League and non-Europa League participation. 
 
Aston Villa 
Everton 
Fulham
 
N
ew
castle 
 
2008/9 to 2010/11 
inclusive 
2007/8 to 2009/10 
inclusive 
2009/10 and 2011/12 
2006/7 and 2012/13 
 
Com
m
ercial 
Sponsorship, advertising and 
m
erchandising; Catering; O
ther 
Sponsorship and other 
com
m
ercial activities 
Com
m
ercial, catering &
 
sponsorship  
 
Turnover 
(£000) 
Com
m
ercial 
activities (£000) 
Turnover 
(£000) 
Com
m
ercial 
activities (£000) 
Turnover 
(£000) 
Com
m
ercial 
activities 
(£000) 
Turnover 
(£000) 
Com
m
ercial 
activities (£000) 
2011/12 
79750 
13098 
16%
 
80531 
10962 
14%
 
78652 
11890 
15%
 
93300 
13800 
15%
 
2010/11 
92028 
13491 
15%
 
82021 
11651 
14%
 
76405 
11307 
15%
 
88464 
15800 
18%
 
2009/10 
90979 
13100 
14%
 
79076 
9676 
12%
 
76398 
10896 
14%
 
52417 
15400 
29%
 
2008/09 
84203 
12013 
14%
 
79669 
9136 
11%
 
63160 
8625 
14%
 
86075 
19400 
23%
 
2007/08 
75537 
10973 
15%
 
75650 
8553 
11%
 
52046 
8491 
16%
 
99358 
25900 
26%
 
2006/07 
52674 
10739 
20%
 
51412 
6860 
13%
 
39244 
7473 
19%
 
87083 
27600 
32%
 
2005/06 
48510 
9448 
19%
 
58123 
13646 
23%
 
37126 
6430 
17%
 
85900 
27900 
32%
 
Avg EL 
89070 
12868 
14%
 
78132 
9122 
12%
 
77525 
11393 
15%
 
87083 
27600 
32%
 
Avg non EL 
64118 
11065 
18%
 
68022 
10780 
16%
 
53596 
8465 
16%
 
84252 
19700 
24%
 
Difference 
24952 
1804 
-3%
 
10110 
-1658 
-4%
 
23929 
2928 
-2%
 
2831 
7900 
8%
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 Table 10. O
verall quantifiable net effects of Europa League participation from
 2006/07  
 
Aston Villa 
Everton 
Fulham
 
N
ew
castle 
 
  
 
  
  
Category  
Financial cost / benefit (£000) 
Prize m
oney difference 
322 
4339 
11240 
4823 
PL position effect 
-750 
-1500 
-3000 
-6000 
EL m
atch day revenues 
5300 
7500 
6500 
9800 
Reduced PL m
atch day revenues 
-2420 
-460 
-100 
-400 
Total effect  
2,452 
9,879 
14,640 
8,223 
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